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LESSONS LEARNED FROM THE FLOOD 
INSURANCE RE-MAPPING CONTROVERSY IN 
PORTLAND, MAINE 
Wesley Davis* 
I.  INTRODUCTION 
Releasing its first updated floodplain map for a major New England 
harbor,1 the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) imposed 
severe building restrictions on Portland, Maine, the largest foreign 
inbound transit tonnage port in the U.S.,2 threatening to leave this 
sheltered waterfront with only fishing shacks.3  Portland is naturally 
protected by islands4 and has been used for centuries as a safe haven for 
ocean-going vessels, including oil tankers, cruise ships, and Coast Guard 
frigates.5  Minute storm damage has been reported over this time.6  Over 
                                            
 * J.D. Candidate, 2011, University of Maine School of Law. 
 1. Tom Bell, New Flood Map – and a New Model, PORTLAND PRESS HERALD, June 5, 
2010, at A1. 
 2. Welcome to Portland’s Downtown District, http://www.portlandmaine.com/ 
index.php?sec=2 (last visited Jan. 21, 2010) [hereinafter Portland’s Downtown District]. 
 3. Tom Porter, Portland Officials Optimistic After Talks on FEMA Flood Map, 
MAINE PUBLIC BROADCASTING, Oct. 27, 2009, http://www.mpbn.net/News/ 
MaineNews/tabid/181/ctl/ViewItem/mid/3475/ItemId/9544/Default.aspx. 
 4. See Christopher Kessler, Sebago Technics Working with FEMA on Flood Map, 
THE SOUTH PORTLANDER, http://fwix.com/portlandme/share/a2bb34d170/ 
sebego_technics_working_with_fema_on_flood_map (last visited Jan. 12, 2010). 
 5. See Porter, supra note 3; Tom Bell, FEMA Threatens Harbor Construction; 
Portland Officials Say a Revised Flood Insurance Map Would Devastate the City’s 
Working Waterfront, PORTLAND PRESS HERALD, Aug. 10, 2009, at A1. 
 6. See Evan Lehmann, Port City Pushes Back Against Washington’s Tightening 
Flood Insurance Definitions, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 29, 2009, 
http://www.nytimes.com/cwire/2009/09/29/29climatewire-port-city-pushes-back-against-
washingtons-ti-24450.html; Bell, supra note 5. 
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the past thirty years, only three insurance claims, totaling $36,000, have 
been paid out.7   
FEMA has an incentive to designate as many properties as possible 
as “high risk.”  Such a classification arrests development and increases 
the local share of the cost of flooding.  These results further the flood 
program’s goal of keeping property and people out of harm’s way and 
reducing the public’s share of the flooding cost.8   
In Portland, where benign waters do not even lap against piers, the 
agency declared that waves were capable of surging three feet in the air 
and crashing down on waterfront property.9  The federal government 
may have zealously cast too wide a net.  The result is that the National 
Flood Insurance Program (NFIP), a scheme created for financial reasons, 
is unnecessarily working against its own purpose by halting development 
and threatening to wreak economic havoc.   
To rectify this, economic factors should be considered when 
determining building restrictions.  Until this is done, cities like Portland 
should not comply with the restrictions.  They can protect their economic 
development interest and are likely to escape any serious repercussions 
for not complying.  FEMA has been unable to adequately enforce its 
building restrictions and its sanctions are light.  Courts also favor 
noncompliant municipalities. 
This Comment will explore these issues.  In Part II, we will gain an 
understanding of the policy reasons behind building restrictions.  We will 
then learn why these policies are fatally flawed.  In Part III, we will 
survey the purpose and limitations of FEMA’s national re-mapping effort 
and how it is being received across the country.  Then, we will hear 
Portland’s story, including the local officials’ arguments against the new 
restrictions on development.  In Part IV, the Author argues that Congress 
and FEMA should incorporate economic factors into the agency’s 
                                            
 7. Tom Bell, FEMA Delays New Flood Map for Portland, PORTLAND PRESS HERALD, 
Sept. 21, 2009, at A1. 
 8. Id.  See generally DISASTERS AND THE LAW: KATRINA AND BEYOND 201, (Daniel 
A. Farber and Jim Chen eds., Aspen Publishers 2006) [hereinafter Farber] (discussing the 
role of mitigation); Martha Thompson & Izaskun Gaviria, WEATHERING THE STORM: 
LESSONS IN RISK REDUCTION FROM CUBA (Oxfam America 2004) (studying Cuba’s ability 
to prevent development in disaster-prone areas); Government Accounting Office, 
FEDERAL EMERGENCY MANAGEMENT AGENCY: OVERSIGHT AND MANAGEMENT OF THE 
NATIONAL FLOOD INSURANCE PROGRAM 12-14 (Oct. 20, 2005) [hereinafter GAO], 
available at http://www.gao.gov/new.items/do6183t.pdf (describing a pilot program that 
requires “repetitive-loss” property owners to sell their property to FEMA or face higher 
insurance rates). 
 9. Lehmann, supra note 6. 
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determination of building restrictions.  In Part V, we will get an update 
on Portland.  Then, we will walk through the options available to similar 
port cities stuck with severe building restrictions.  The most palatable 
one is non-compliance.  We will discuss why it enjoys a favorable legal 
position, including courts’ unwillingness to burden municipalities with 
massive liability.  We will also look at the risks involved. 
II.  FEDERAL FLOOD POLICY 
Flooding is a matter of public policy because market economies do 
not have the capacity to handle the problem.  Involved in nearly 90 
percent of all disasters, flooding is the most common natural disaster and 
the most destructive to property.10  The risk of exposure is so great that it 
is actuarially unsound for insurance companies to insure against it.11  
Property owners will not find flood coverage in their homeowner’s 
insurance.12  A catastrophic flooding event exceeds the capacity of the 
insurance industry.13  All fifty U.S. states are subject to the risk of a 
catastrophic flooding event.14 
In the early years of American life, flooding was a problem for local 
government.  Natural disasters, isolated instances in localized areas, were 
not within the purview of the national government.  Federalism was in its 
purest form.  The central government confined itself chiefly to matters of 
international and national concerns.  States dominated their local 
jurisdictions and the federal government had neither the political will nor 
the power to wield control over local matters.  Accordingly, federal aid 
did not flow in to relieve victims of natural disasters.15  Instead, local 
officials and private entities responded.16  As one commentator pointed 
out, victims “were pretty much on their own.”17   
                                            
 10. RAWLE O. KING, FEDERAL FLOOD INSURANCE: THE REPETITIVE-LOSS PROBLEM ii, 
1 (Congressional Research Service, June 30, 2005). 
 11. RAWLE O. KING, MIDWEST FLOODING DISASTER: RETHINKING FEDERAL FLOOD 
INSURANCE? 4 (Congressional Research Service, Aug. 11, 2008). 
 12. RAWLE O. KING, HURRICANE KATRINA: INSURANCE LOSSES AND NATIONAL 
CAPACITIES FOR FINANCING DISASTER RISK 7 (Congressional Research Service, Sept. 15, 
2005). 
 13. Id. 
 14. Id. 
 15. Stephen Griffin, Did the Constitution Fail New Orleans?, BALKANIZATION, (Oct. 
12, 2005, 10:31 P.M.), http://balkin.blogspot.com/2005/10/did-constitution-fail-new-
orleans-part.html. 
 16. Id. 
 17. Id. 
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Eventually, this early federalism eroded and the national government 
adopted a “levee-only” structural approach.  The federal government was 
spurred on by major flooding events.18  The crush of extensive property 
damage and the expense of public disaster relief following three decades 
of Mississippi River flooding compelled Congress to take its first major 
crack at flood policy.19  It created the Mississippi River Commission in 
1879,20 and charged it with oversight of levee development for the next 
fifty years.21  The federal government was operating in the era when man 
believed he could overcome any problem with engineering.  Redirecting 
the natural flow of water was a prime example.  In 1917, the U.S. Army 
Corps of Engineers got heavily involved.22  The 1930s and 1940s saw 
$11 billion of federal levee spending.23   
Enthusiasm for the structural approach began to wane in the 1950s 
and 1960s.  The sheer cost and vastness of the levee-only approach 
proved unwieldy and the growing environmental conscience of the U.S. 
was repulsed by the resulting environmental destruction.24  Later it would 
be proved that the levees would sometimes fail to keep the water out.  In 
these instances, levees actually increased the amount of property damage 
because the public rapidly developed property behind levees under the 
false assumption that they would be flood-proof.25   
These structural disappointments got policymakers thinking about 
non-structural approaches, especially insurance and mitigation.  It was 
another slew of disasters that urged policymakers to consider fabricating 
an insurance system.  Hurricane Betsey and other storms in the 1960s 
ravaged the South and flooded the upper Mississippi River.26  A huge 
part of the cost of disaster aid was put on the federal government.  The 
taxpayer picked up the ultimate tab.  Policymakers thought a 
manufactured insurance system could relieve the burden.  The hope was 
that it would re-allocate the cost of the risk of flooding back to those who 
took the risk by living in floodplains.  The government would act just 
                                            
 18. Id. 
 19. King, supra note 11, at 4. 
 20. Id. 
 21. Id. 
 22. Id. 
 23. DAVID GODSCHALK ET AL, NATURAL HAZARD MITIGATION: RECASTING DISASTER 
POLICY AND PLANNING 31 (Island Press 1999). 
 24. Id.; King, supra note 11, at 4. 
 25. Charles S. Clark, Disaster Response: Does the Country Need a New National 
Strategy?, 3 CQ RESEARCHER 889 (1993), available at http://library.cqpress.com/ 
cqresearcher/document.php?id=cqresrre1993101500#NOTE[6]. 
 26. King, supra note 10, at 3. 
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like an insurance company, spreading the risk across its policyholders 
through premiums.   
But, it could not allocate all of the cost of the risk back to those 
taking the risk.  The premiums would be prohibitively expensive.  
Unaffordable premiums prevented a market-based insurance system from 
developing in the first place.  A government system would have to allow 
for affordable insurance premiums.   
But by doing so, it would not be spreading the great financial risk of 
flooding in an actuarially-sound manner, leaving it and the taxpayer 
exposed to that risk.  To try to deal with this, policymakers 
recommended mitigation.  The federal government would mitigate 
damage by discouraging construction in floodplains.  In theory, these 
requirements would reduce the amount of property in harm’s way and 
bring down the cost of claims. 
A.  Mitigation 
Mitigation has been widely lauded as the most effective flooding 
response.  Commentators Daniel A. Farber and Jim Chen call it 
“crucial.”27  Another commentator, David Godschalk, argues that it is the 
most critical of the four stages of disaster response: mitigation, 
preparation, response, and recovery.28  Of these stages, mitigation is the 
only one that takes place well before the event.  Advance action is much 
more cost-effective than post-disaster reconstruction, particularly for 
recurrent damage.29  Effective mitigation reduces the magnitude of future 
disasters and results in a substantially reduced cost for both response and 
recovery.30  Many observers feel the only “sensible” policy is “strategic 
retreat.”31  Farber and Chen echo this sentiment, wondering if the most 
effective way to deal with disaster is to “stay out of the danger zone.”32 
Congress adopted this insurance-mitigation approach in the form of a 
carrot-and-stick program.  In 1968, Congress created the NFIP, currently 
administered by FEMA, with passage of the National Flood Insurance 
Act (NFIA).  Through the program, Congress offers subsidized 
insurance.  But the subsidies come at a price.  Property owners can only 
receive it if their municipality takes certain steps to mitigate future 
                                            
 27. Farber, supra note 8, at 201. 
 28. GODSCHALK, supra note 23, at 17. 
 29. Id. at 5, 17. 
 30. Id. at 17. 
 31. Id. at 34. 
 32. Farber, supra note 8, at 213.  Oddly enough, “strategic retreat” is little more than a 
concession of defeat and an inability to effectively deal with flooding and its threat. 
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damage.  The municipality must implement land use controls specifically 
prescribed by FEMA that restrict the development of floodplain property.  
Land use control is the NFIP’s leading mitigation device, but it also 
reduces flood damage by acquiring high-risk properties and relocating 
their owners. 
In practice, however, the mitigation scheme, like federal policies 
before it, has been a disappointment.  A policy of acquisition can bring 
some isolated successes, but it is not a practical large-scale solution.  
Policymakers began exploring eminent domain in the 1970s and 1980s.33  
Tulsa, Oklahoma, was an early pioneer when it began clearing 
development out of its floodplain in the 1970s.34  By the 1990s it had 
acquired 875 buildings.35  When the Army Corps of Engineers offered to 
build a $3.5 million levee for Soldier’s Grove, Wisconsin, it chose 
instead to relocate the entire town outside the floodplain.36  In 1983, a 
cost-benefit analysis by the Flooded Properties Purchase Program 
(FPPP), the NFIP’s acquisition arm, resulted in the purchase and 
demolition of a 300-home neighborhood in Baytown, Texas, that had 
been the repeated victim of flooding and was in the process of being 
rebuilt.37  After the 1993 Midwest floods, the federal government 
implemented an aggressive relocation plan, orchestrating 156 buyout 
projects in nine states, acquiring more than 9,000 properties.38   
These were all successful relocation projects but they comprise only 
a negligible slice of the number and value of properties that stand in 
harm’s way.  Lack of funding or political or psychological will prevent 
any meaningful progress.  Both the cost and the idea of a comprehensive 
buyout strategy are unpalatable.  The FPPP has been historically 
underfunded.  Only a small number of properties, about 100 per year, can 
be purchased.39   
Unlike acquisitions, land use controls are affordable but their 
corresponding lack of financial incentives has been their downfall.  This 
lack conspires with the value of floodplain property and the result is 
major increases in floodplain development.  In spite of the cost of a 1993 
flood, the St. Louis region and several other localities reloaded their 
                                            
 33. Godschalk, supra note 23, at 32. 
 34. Id. 
 35. Id. 
 36. Id. 
 37. Id. 
 38. Id. 
 39. Id. 
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floodplains with new urban and suburban development.40  When these 
vulnerable areas were hit again by another flood, the cost of disaster 
assistance vastly increased.  Increased costs like these wipe out any 
potential savings gained by successful mitigation efforts elsewhere.41   
This shortcoming is traceable to human nature and property rights.  
Land use controls involve the unnatural human trade-off of economic 
sacrifices today for unknown benefits at some unknown future time.  
While advance action is the reason mitigation can be so effective, it is 
also the reason why mitigation is so difficult to implement.  The 
authoritarian state of Cuba has been able to enforce an effective 
mitigation regime,42 but governments blessed with (or hampered by) 
market economies have not been so fortunate.43  Proponents of land use 
control surmise that the public just does not understand the potential 
benefits.44 
A bigger roadblock may be the cultural belief that owners have a 
fundamental right to dispense with their property as they see fit.  Owners 
believe they have some kind of natural right to their property and this 
belief is reinforced by our political and judicial systems.45  It is written 
into the Constitution.46  Courts have been willing to extend the Fifth 
Amendment limitation on taking property to the mere minimization of 
property rights47 or to regulations that go “too far.”48  The protection 
afforded by these cases is readily transferable to flood-related land use 
controls.  Such an application would in turn make these controls 
prohibitively expensive.  
                                            
 40. Nicholas Pinter, One Step Forward, Two Steps Back on U.S. Floodplains, 308 
SCIENCE 207, 207-08 (2005). 
 41. Id. 
 42. See generally Thompson, supra note 8. 
 43. Farber, supra note 8, at 213. 
 44. See Godschalk, supra note 23, at 17. 
 45. Farber, supra note 8, at 220. 
 46. U.S. CONST. amends. V, XIV § 1. 
 47. See generally Loretto v. Teleprompter Manhattan CATV Corp., 458 U.S. 419 
(1982) (holding that the installation of a cable line was a per se taking). 
 48. E.g., Pa. Coal v. Mahon, 260 U.S. 393, 415 (1922) (holding that a regulation can 
go “too far” and constitute a taking); see generally Pa. Cent. Transp. Co. v. N.Y., 438 
U.S. 104 (1978) (establishing that a regulatory taking can occur when a regulation 
unreasonably interferes with “investment-backed expectations”); Lucas v. S.C. Coastal 
Council, 505 U.S. 1003 (1992) (holding that beachfront land use controls barring 
permanent structures is a taking).  
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III.  RE-MAPPING AND PORTLAND HARBOR 
The futility of mitigation policies, especially land use controls, has 
become evident, but they are still law.  FEMA must try to maintain 
accurate floodplain maps so it can determine the specific land use 
controls required, as well as the amount of insurance premiums.  In 1997, 
the agency began updating its cartographic mapping system with more 
accurate and accessible digital maps.49  In 2003, it formalized this effort 
with the Flood Map Modernization Program, which is part of a broader 
mapping, assessment, and planning regime that is funded through 2014.50  
Its goal is to re-map the land on which 93 percent of the nation’s 
population resides.51  Many maps had not been updated in thirty to forty 
years.52  Some were based on ninety-year-old data.53  Cumbersome and 
full of “gross errors,” the old maps prevented effective determination and 
enforcement of land use controls.54  The new maps increase FEMA’s 
ability to identify the severest areas, which is resulting in a broader 
floodplain determination and higher risk assessments for more 
properties.55 
Despite advances, the re-mapping effort is still seriously 
handicapped.  It only has an $800 million budget.56  This is a nominal 
amount for a project that must cover nearly the entire American 
population.  This constraint only allows FEMA to proceed in a 
“piecemeal fashion”57 and is limiting the project’s effectiveness.  Many 
flaws in the older maps are not being corrected.58  The new program’s 
data-collection scheme is generic.  It fails to account for local variations 
                                            
 49. John Caulfield, New Flood Maps Raise New Land-Use Concerns, BUILDER, (Aug. 
14, 2009), available at http://www.builderonline.com/land/new-flood-maps-raise-new-
land-use-concerns.aspx.  
 50. Id. 
 51. Id. 
 52. Id.; Catherine Saillant, New Flood Maps Swamp Homeowners, L.A. TIMES, Jan. 4, 
2010, at A1. 
 53. Me. State Planning Office, Floodplain Mapping Modernization, 
http://www.maine.gov/spo/flood/maps/mapmodernization.htm (last visited Jan. 13, 2010) 
[hereinafter Maine SPO]. 
 54. Caulfield, supra note 49. 
 55. Id.; Lehmann, supra note 6. 
 56. Caulfield, supra note 49. 
 57. Portland Officials Push Back on New FEMA Flood Map, COASTAL CONTRACTOR 
ONLINE, http://www.coastalcontractor.net/article/288.html (last visited Jan. 12, 2010); see 
also FEDERAL EMERGENCY MANAGEMENT AGENCY, ESTIMATING THE VALUE OF PARTNER 
CONTRIBUTIONS TO FLOOD MAPPING PROJECTS, at 2 (Jan. 2009) [hereinafter FEMA].  
 58. Maine SPO, supra note 53. 
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and this can significantly skew the results.  FEMA concedes the maps 
have accuracy problems.59   
The maps are also difficult to understand.  They are confusing and 
owners are having a hard time determining if their properties are in 
designated flood zones or not.60  As a matter of policy, the agency 
strongly encourages property owners to question the new maps.  It also 
acknowledges that it should be doing more outreach to help the public 
understand both the maps and their purpose.61   
FEMA has sought out an inexpensive solution to all these problems 
but it has been met with limited success.  The agency knows that local 
involvement in the development and maintenance of the maps would 
result in better determinations.62  In 1999, it created the Cooperating 
Technical Partners (CTP) program,63 which makes local groups official 
partners.64  As of 2009, over 236 groups have been made “partners.”65  
Through these partnerships, FEMA gains local knowledge without 
paying for it.66  The agency also welcomes input from local groups 
during the formal comment period, which occurs after a preliminary map 
is presented.67  However, many local groups have no interest in bearing 
the cost for a program that is resulting in greater building restrictions 
without any corresponding benefits.68 
As FEMA has introduced the new maps, property owners have been 
dismayed by surprisingly higher risk determinations accompanied by 
new premiums and building restrictions.  In Long Island, 4,700 homes 
previously determined to be in a floodplain were removed from that 
designation, but 25,000 residents found themselves in newly designated 
floodplains.69  The number of affected homes in Sioux Falls, South 
Dakota, more than tripled from 800 to 2,600.70  The change in expected 
                                            
 59. Porter, supra note 3. 
 60. Id. 
 61. Laura Dolce and Steve Bodnar, Kennebunk, Kennebunkport to Question New 
Floodplain Maps, SEACOASTONLINE, (Dec. 10, 2009), http://www.seacoastonline.com/ 
articles/20091210-NEWS-912100375. 
 62. FEMA, supra note 57, at 2. 
 63. Id. 
 64. Id. 
 65. Id. 
 66. Id. 
 67. 42 U.S.C. § 4104(b) (2006). 
 68. See Porter, supra note 3.  
 69. Caulfield, supra note 49. 
 70. Id. 
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flooding was also dramatic.  In Mecklenburg County, North Carolina, the 
new determinations raised the expected flood elevations by eight feet.71 
The agency’s lack of outreach has left many homeowners unaware of 
their right to question and challenge the new maps.72  One homeowner 
from South Los Angeles said the first she heard of the new designation 
was when she received a letter from her lender saying she had thirty days 
to get a flood insurance policy.73 
Many other property owners and local governments have rebuffed 
the higher premiums and greater restrictions, with mixed results.  One 
Los Angeles resident won her dispute after paying $1,400 for a 
surveyor.74  A neighborhood group from Southern California met with 
limited success.  After generating data of its own, it accused FEMA of 
rushing the process, producing contradictory maps, and yielding dubious 
results.75  It got the agency to postpone adopting the maps for three years 
to allow for more study,76 but whether any meaningful change will come 
is uncertain.  The Moorpark (California) City Council faced a worst-case 
scenario.  It threw $100,000 into a study that resulted in no meaningful 
change.77 
A.  Portland Harbor 
In July 2009, FEMA released its preliminary maps for Portland 
Harbor in Maine.78  Portland Harbor is the largest foreign inbound transit 
tonnage port in the U.S. 79  It is one of the few working waterfronts in the 
U.S.80  It is the second largest oil port on the East Coast.81  It is also the 
largest tonnage seaport in New England and its second largest fishing 
port.82  Representatives from other major ports in the region, including 
Boston, closely watched Portland’s re-mapping process.83  
                                            
 71. Id. 
 72. 42 U.S.C. § 4104(b) (1983). 
 73. Saillant, supra note 52. 
 74. Id. 
 75. Id. 
 76. Id. 
 77. Id.  
 78. See Bell, supra note 7. 
 79. Portland’s Downtown District, supra note 2. 
 80. Id. 
 81. Id. 
 82. Id. 
 83. See Bell, supra note 7. 
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Portland Harbor’s new maps showed a drastically higher flood risk.  
Its piers and wharves used to be in an “A-zone.”84  This means it was 
expected that one foot of flooding would occur once every 100 years.85  
This is the lowest floodplain designation.  In the new maps, however, the 
piers and wharves were placed in a “V-zone.”86  This is one of the 
highest risk designations.87  “V” is short for velocity.88  High velocity 
wind and waves were expected to impact the areas so designated.89  
Specifically, high velocity winds were expected to whip up three foot 
waves once every one hundred years.90  Catastrophic consequences are 
expected.  Large waves would crash into land and tear down buildings or 
cause substantial structural damage.91  FEMA’s flood risk assessment 
had drastically swung from quite mild to extremely dangerous. 
This new determination brings with it severe building restrictions.92  
In the previous “A-zone” classification, harbor structures were only 
required to maintain a slightly raised ground floor: one foot above 
normal.93  But with a “V-zone” designation there is a complete ban on 
new construction.94  In addition, current buildings cannot be fully rebuilt 
if they need repair.95  They can only be rebuilt to half their value.96  
Currently over the harbor piers and wharves sit condominiums, offices, 
restaurants, and lobstermen.97  The new designation would likely halt all 
development and leave lobstermen and other fishermen as the only 
remaining tenants.98 
Before the new maps were released, a study was done that showed 
immeasurable property development potential for the waterfront.99  The 
                                            
 84. Lehmann, supra note 6. 
 85. Institute for Business and Home Safety, HURRICANE IKE: NATURE’S FORCE VS. 
STRUCTURAL STRENGTH 7 (Sept. 2009), available at  http://www.disastersafety.org/ 
resource/resmgr/pdfs/hurricane_ike.pdf [hereinafter IBHS]. 
 86. Lehmann, supra note 6. 
 87. Id. 
 88. Id. 
 89. Id. 
 90. Id. 
 91. Id. 
 92. Lehmann, supra note 6. 
 93. Id. 
 94. Bell, supra note 7. 
 95. Id. 
 96. Bell, supra note 5. 
 97. Lehmann, supra note 6. 
 98. Porter, supra note 3. 
 99. Rebecca Goldfine, Waterfront a development goldmine, MAINEBIZ, Dec. 8, 2009, 
available at http://www.mainebiz.biz/news45565.html (last visited Jan. 13, 2010). 
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study found more than 20 acres of development property.100  A 
centerpiece of the development opportunity was the seven-acre Maine 
State Pier.101  The study also emphasized attractive features such as the 
port’s expanding cruise ship commerce and a ready market for a hotel on 
the waterfront.102  This is in a city that already sports a vibrant waterfront 
shopping and dining culture.103   
The study was done by a real estate consulting firm that specialized 
in lesser known New England markets, including Providence, Rhode 
Island, and was presented to the leading investment groups in the area, 
including private equity fund managers and bankers.104  Portland is 
Northern New England’s banking capital,105 in addition to Maine’s 
economic and commercial hub.  Finalized after the release of FEMA’s 
maps, the study warned about the negative economic consequences of 
the new restrictions.106  
B.  Portland’s Response 
Local officials feared the potential economic impact of the 
restrictions.  Besides losing development due to the complete restriction 
on new construction, they worried that the new disincentive to build 
would lead to properties falling into disrepair, causing a blight on the 
community in general, a condition that Portland once experienced and 
does not want to see return.  Officials had 30 days to respond to the new 
maps and did so vigorously.  City and state leaders, including most of 
Maine’s congressional delegation, urged FEMA officials to reconsider.107   
They used political pressure, called for the creation of a regulatory 
niche for harbors, and made an economic argument.  U.S. Senator Susan 
Collins used the occasion of the August confirmation hearing of the 
second highest FEMA official, Deputy Administrator Richard Serino, to 
bring attention to the Portland problem.  The ranking Republican on the 
Senate Homeland Security Committee (which oversees FEMA), Collins 
called for the agency to work with local officials to produce a more 
accurate risk assessment.108  
                                            
 100. Id. 
 101. Id. 
 102. Id. 
 103. Portland’s Downtown District, supra note 2. 
 104. Goldfine, supra note 99. 
 105. Portland’s Downtown District, supra note 2. 
 106. Id. 
 107. Porter, supra note 3. 
 108. Bell, supra note 7. 
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The following day, the agency decided to delay the remapping of the 
harbor.  It suspended the 90-day appeal period, which had been 
scheduled to commence immediately following the comment period.  
FEMA cited technical errors in the community notification process as the 
reason for the delay.  Perhaps the agency feared litigation, a possibility 
which Collins referenced in her testimony.109  In 2005, the U.S. District 
Court of South Carolina invalidated FEMA’s map determinations for 
Richland County, S.C., because it failed to give proper notice of the start 
of the comment period.110 
Although FEMA may have yielded to political pressure to postpone 
the finalization of its maps, it is loath to change any maps on political 
pressure alone without any scientific data to validate such a change.111  
The agency would face severe criticism for shifting its position based on 
political pressure.112  Moreover, Congress has charged FEMA to alter a 
flood map only if it is scientifically or technically incorrect.113   
Local leaders began pointing at specific weaknesses in the agency’s 
findings.  Much of it was based on information not specific to the harbor 
area.  This is a well-established flaw of the mapping program.  FEMA 
analyzed the less calm eastern section of the shore and failed to take into 
account the calmer western region.114  FEMA also mistakenly found that 
a seventy-one mile per hour wind could persist for an hour over the 
harbor.115  Sustained winds have never exceeded fifty miles per hour.116  
City officials recommended the agency place a tidal gauge in the harbor 
for a year to get a more realistic impression.117 
To have a chance at being persuasive, local officials knew they 
needed compelling data.  “We follow the science,” said one FEMA 
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official.118  Portland engaged an engineering firm, which collected 
significantly more measurement points than FEMA.  It statistically 
established the wave-calming influence of the harbor islands and more 
accurately depicted potential wave action.119  The city hoped the new 
data would lead to a redrawn map.120  
Portland’s scientific input was welcomed by FEMA.  The agency 
encourages local participation.  “Now if someone like the city of 
Portland comes and says, ‘Well, you were gathering your scientific 
information from this point in the area, and we have other validated 
scientific information from another point,’ then of course we look at 
that,” said agency spokesman Dennis Pinkham.121  FEMA’s Regional 
Administrator Paul Ford agreed to review Portland’s entire study.122 
The agency took steps to improve its findings.  It reran some specific 
modeling.123  FEMA had analyzed how a one hundred year storm would 
affect the Portland Fish Pier, which is located toward the eastern section 
of the harbor.  Originally, it showed that five foot waves would occur.124  
The second time, the modeling resulted in a much lower wave height: 
only three feet, three inches.125  This is just barely high enough to qualify 
for the V-zone designation.  The cut-off is three feet.  FEMA 
acknowledged that it might do some other reanalysis as well.126  One 
spokesman admitted that, “there is certainly additional modeling and 
more detailed modeling that could be done.”127   
He warned, however, “That [it] may or not make a difference in 
terms of what the maps look like.”128  If Portland’s efforts are 
unsuccessful, there will be no reimbursement from the agency129 for the 
cost of the city’s studies, which is at least $10,000.130  The city officials 
urged the federal government to stop shifting the re-mapping cost onto 
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local communities.131  U.S. Congresswoman Pingree said this is an unfair 
burden that “should have [been borne by] FEMA in the first place.”132  
U.S. Senator Susan Collins also found it “troubling” that Portland must 
“shoulder the financial burdens of correcting FEMA’s mistakes.”133   
At the same time that they was challenging FEMA’s data, local 
officials were calling on Congress and FEMA to draw up laws and 
regulations that better suit urban waterfronts.  Portland Harbor and others 
like it have a different natural environment.  The FEMA’s program is 
best applicable to environmentally sensitive areas like coastal plains, not 
to fishing ports in sheltered harbors.134  These harbors are chosen 
specifically because they are better protected naturally.  They do not 
have the same vulnerability.  They should not receive the same treatment 
nor bear the same mitigation costs.  FEMA will continue to run into 
resistance from port cities.  It should carve out an exception for working 
waterfronts, which do not fit FEMA’s homogeneous method.   
Local officials supported this contention with anecdotal and 
technical evidence.  Portland Harbor is densely-built, has been developed 
over several hundred years, and has proven itself in the worst weather.135  
The harbor’s piers and wharves calm waves.136  Government frigates and 
major passenger and commercial vessels use Portland as a safe harbor.  
No catastrophic storm has hit Portland Harbor in the last one hundred 
years (the period of time used to establish flooding risk).137  For any 
flooding to occur, the harbor tide gauge must exceed 12 feet.138  The 
highest tide ever recorded was only 2 feet higher at 14.17 feet when the 
infamous Blizzard of 1978 damaged one of the wharves.139  An April 
2007 storm, locally remembered as the Patriot’s Day storm, which 
brought down several moored boats, caused no damage to the wharves 
and only crested the 12 foot mark by 1 foot, reaching 13.28.140  The 
owner of a two hundred year old concrete pier could find no documented 
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evidence of 3 foot wave damage in its storied history.141  Pier owners 
have made no significant insurance claims.142 
Local officials also felt that economic factors should be considered 
when determining building restrictions.  Collins said FEMA’s maps 
should not “unduly burden[] the city and its residents.”143  U.S. 
Congresswoman Pingree called the restrictions on development a “huge 
economic burden” that would be “devastating” given the current 
economic climate “in particular.”144  A city official said “what you are in 
effect doing is putting these waterfronts out of business.”145  City 
officials acknowledged that protecting lives and property is paramount 
but felt that economic considerations should not be wholly ignored.146 
IV.  NEED FOR ECONOMIC ANALYSIS 
Science and safety are essential, but economic factors are also 
important.  They should be considered whenever practical.  To support 
this proposition one need look no further than the NFIP itself.  It was 
created to address economic concerns, primarily the growing financial 
burden of flooding on the federal government.  The program’s insurance 
component was designed to shift this burden off the general taxpayer and 
onto those taking the risk.  The program’s mitigation component was 
also intended to reduce financial exposure. 
There should be economic safeguards in place so that FEMA’s 
mitigation determinations, such as building restrictions, do not create a 
worse economic situation than before.  Ironically, mitigation efforts may 
actually be increasing the overall economic cost of flooding.  This is due 
to the cost of lost opportunity.  Building restrictions may be warranted 
where development potential is slight.  Severe restrictions may even be 
desirable where development potential is high because the risk of 
flooding and the cost of rebuilding are also high.  But in places like 
Portland, where the economic opportunity is high and the risk of flooding 
low, building restrictions may be ill-advised.  Here, the natural human 
aversion to mitigation may be well-placed: potential future benefits will 
not exceed the initial economic sacrifice.   
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Sheltered harbors that drive major economic activity litter the coast.  
In places like Portland, there is little evidence that mitigation will prevent 
much property damage.  In Portland there has been minute damage to the 
waterfront over centuries because of natural defenses.  Where little 
damage is likely, are economically destructive restrictions on 
development appropriate?  This is an especially apropos question in the 
present economic climate.  
The economic importance of coastal development is indisputable.  
The property that runs along the Gulf and Atlantic coasts alone is valued 
at $9 trillion.147  Much of this is attributable to giant commercial centers, 
derived from their mercantile past where they served as conduit points 
between the shipping lanes of the open ocean and the inland networks of 
road and rail. 
Not only financial health but psychological well-being is also at 
stake.  The high economic value of coastal land is not merely about 
dollars and cents.148  The purely recreational and personal value of the 
coast cannot be denied.  People love the coast.  This fact is evident from 
the massive wealth on display in mansions and resorts from Bar Harbor, 
Maine to Sarasota, Florida and in places like Newport, Rhode Island.  
People love to be near the water, especially the coast where they can 
watch the sublime movements of the currents go on until they meet the 
vast, open sky.  People enjoy watching boats float atop the ocean’s 
bosom.  They like to interact where the land and ocean meet in work and 
in play in ways they have done for millennia.   
Governments also recognize this value.  Their respect for the 
personal and public pursuit of waterfront living can be seen from Oregon 
to the Great Lakes to Maine.  They support public access, right-of-ways, 
and the public trust doctrine.  The federal government should not 
discourage this natural pursuit of waterfront living by pushing people 
away through questionable mitigation policies.  Either FEMA through 
regulation, or Congress through statute, should incorporate economic 
factors into the agency’s mitigation determinations.   
FEMA’s limited ability to collect accurate data is another reason for 
incorporating economic factors.  For its part, FEMA is an agency with a 
mindset for technical data.  A spokesman involved in the Portland 
mapping project said that “[o]ur job is to map risk and identify that risk 
and put it on the map as best we can.  That is our job and what we are 
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charged by Congress to do.”149  As a result, FEMA rightfully puts a lot of 
focus on accuracy, but because of its limited resources, its data-collection 
is limited and homogeneous, and often a poor predictor.  The agency 
could compensate for this weakness by considering other, nonphysical 
factors.   
The mechanism for incorporating economic factors could be as 
follows.  First, as it does now, FEMA would ascertain as accurately as 
possible the flood predictors, but this would not be the final determinant.  
Second, it would derive from the flood maps the building restrictions 
necessary to prevent property damage.  Third, it would determine the 
financial savings that would result.  Fourth, it would discount the 
projected savings by the projected loss of economic development.  
Where the savings exceed the loss, the requirements should be 
implemented.  Where the loss exceeds the savings, lesser restrictions 
should be applied as safety permits.  This would produce a much more 
economically efficient mitigation plan.  Even if FEMA’s current analysis 
accounts for lost opportunity to some degree, this needs to be more 
robust, as evidenced by Portland, where the restrictions were overly 
damaging economically. 
With the likelihood that FEMA lacks authority or political will to 
incorporate economic factors into its determinations, Congress should 
mandate it.  It has started down this road.  On July 15, 2010, the U.S. 
House of Representatives passed legislation that would require FEMA to 
study “the impact of working waterfronts on storm and flood risk.”150  
Portland’s U.S. Representative, Chellie Pingree, introduced the 
amendment as a direct result of the city’s experience.151  The requirement 
is part of a larger bill to reform the NFIP but it will have difficulty 
clearing the Senate.  Even if it becomes law, the changes will not take 
effect until the next re-mapping program,152 which could be decades 
away.  That will be too late to help port cities stuck with restrictions on 
development as a result of this current re-mapping effort.   
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V.  AVOIDING ECONOMIC LOSS 
Portland will not be one of those port cities.  In June 2010, FEMA 
released revised maps.153  With the exception of the Maine State Pier, the 
entire harbor was put back into an “A-zone,” where there are no 
significant building restrictions.154  The agency had been persuaded by 
local efforts and essentially reversed its position.  The harbor’s private 
property owners will be free to develop.  In October 2010, FEMA went a 
step further.  It again withdrew its maps, this time in favor of an entirely 
new program which calls for total collaboration with local authorities.155  
Local groups may be spared much of the cost of their studies, so long as 
they are made “incident to any appeal.”156  Congress requires FEMA to 
reimburse parties that win their appeals, though only for expenses 
directly related to the agency’s changed position.157  Expenses incurred 
during the comment period may not be considered “incident to any 
appeal” and may not be reimbursable.  Whether or not political or 
economic influences had a strong effect on these outcomes, FEMA and 
local officials credited the new, locally supplied data for the change.158 
Not all results will be as cheery as Portland’s.  Several major coastal 
cities still stand in the eye of the re-mapping storm, including Boston, 
Providence, Portsmouth (New Hampshire), and New Haven 
(Connecticut).  If these cities are stuck with restrictions on development, 
they should first appeal FEMA’s final decision to a U.S. District Court.  
However, a favorable outcome is not promising.  For organizations with 
vast financial resources, an appeal could be advantageous.   It could 
provide leverage over an agency eager to avoid expensive litigation.159  
But most municipalities, even large cities, cannot afford expensive 
litigation, especially in this tight economic climate.   
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Even if a port city could afford to mount an appeal, courts are 
unlikely to reverse FEMA’s determinations because of highly deferential 
standards of review.  Judicial review is governed by the Administrative 
Procedures Act.160  As such, a de novo review would only be available if 
the agency determination was adjudicatory in nature.161  Courts have 
repeatedly held that flood map determinations are not adjudicatory, but 
quasi-legislative.162  As a result, the court will only look to see if the 
determination was arbitrary or capricious.163  The cards are stacked even 
further against appellants by courts’ deferral to FEMA’s technical 
expertise.164 
A port city could not even use pending litigation to temporarily 
enjoin the implementation of the determinations.  Congress specifically 
provided that maps go into effect despite pending litigation.165  There is 
an exception if good cause is shown, but this would be little help.  A port 
city could argue that FEMA’s determinations were inaccurate or 
insufficient but a court would likely see FEMA’s technical data as 
authoritative.  A port city could also make a public policy argument on 
economic grounds, but this would also fail because there is no support 
for it in the governing statutory and regulatory laws.   
A.  A Port City’s Spectrum of Options 
With dim prospects in an appeal, a port city can look to three other 
options which run along a spectrum.  Sitting to one side of the spectrum 
is the option to completely submit to FEMA’s building restrictions.  This 
option is politically feasible.  Port city officials would keep their jobs 
because they would preserve subsidized flood insurance for their 
citizens.  A catastrophic event is unforeseeable in cities like Portland, but 
voters know that some isolated flooding, inland or otherwise, is liable to 
occur.  Wary of their own potential loss, these voters would be happy 
that they still have their affordable insurance and would not be so 
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concerned about losing economic development on the waterfront.  They 
would directly feel the effect of losing flood insurance (even if just on 
their psyche) but would not feel any direct or immediate loss from a bar 
against development.  However, the long-term economic consequences 
of such a move could be devastating. 
Officials could look to the opposite end of the spectrum and choose 
to completely withdraw from the NFIP.  This would be economically 
beneficial overall.  Breaking ties with the program would set a port city 
free to exploit waterfront development.  It would also spell the end of 
subsidized insurance, but cities like Portland, with natural physical 
barriers, do not suffer the serious coastal and inland flooding seen in the 
Midwest, Gulf region, and Northern California.  Subsidized flood 
insurance is not as economically significant in places like Portland.  
Some property owners would suffer flood damage, but the city could use 
funds derived from waterfront development to aid them.   
Although withdrawal is economically favorable, the loss of 
subsidized insurance would be politically untenable.  There would be 
some voters in favor of withdrawal because it would end the unpopular 
requirement that owners of high risk properties purchase insurance.166  
However, the political support for subsidized insurance would be much 
more powerful.   
B.  Non-Compliance and Its Favorable Legal Landscape 
While submission at one end of the spectrum is economically 
dangerous, and withdrawal at the other end is politically untenable, in the 
center lies a more palatable option.  A port city could remain in the 
NFIP, but not comply with the building restrictions.  With this option, 
the city could try to maintain the best of both worlds.  It could have 
economically vital waterfront development and politically valuable 
subsidized insurance.  Based on history, a port city could be successful 
taking this approach. 
FEMA has limited oversight ability.  The drive to develop has been 
too powerful for the agency’s limited resources.  According to Professor 
Oliver Houck, where the flooding risk is low and the building restrictions 
are modest, compliance is generally good because “no one’s shoe is 
pinched.”167  But, where the risk is high and the restrictions on 
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development are severe, development overrides compliance.168   Even 
“an army of inspectors”169 could not oversee all twenty-thousand 
participating communities.  A non-complying port city could easily fly 
under the radar.   
A port city has every reason to try non-compliance because even if it 
gets caught, FEMA’s sanctions are light.  The agency penalizes a non-
complying community by removing it from the NFIP, but it is allowed to 
return to the program in full as soon as it implements a mechanism to 
enforce FEMA’s building restrictions.  This is a reform which could be 
accomplished in a relatively short time.  A port city would only see a 
brief hiatus from the program.  No other sanctions or penalties are 
imposed.  As Professor Houck laments, “a sanction which merely 
removes a non-complying community from the program until it cleans 
house would, in effect, be license to get away with the maximum 
infractions before the inspectors arrived.”170    
Sparse monitoring coupled with a light penalty means that a non-
complying port city could enjoy years of unmonitored waterfront 
development with little risk of reprisal.  At worst, it would suffer a brief 
time-out from the NFIP before returning to the program in full.  Perhaps, 
it could lapse back into non-compliance again a short time later.  This 
cycle could go on indefinitely. 
1.  Courts’ Unwillingness to Burden Municipalities with Liability 
Pursuing a remedy in the court system would seem like a good idea 
for FEMA, but the courts have been reluctant to assign liability to non-
complying municipalities.  A successful court decision or two would be a 
relatively inexpensive tool for FEMA in compelling compliance 
nationwide, but the courts have been historically unwilling to burden 
municipalities with “massive” contractual or tort liability. 
The seminal case on contract liability is U.S. v. Parish of St. 
Bernard, decided by the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit in 
1985.171  The Parish of St. Bernard was a poor Louisiana municipality 
that disregarded NFIP requirements to mitigate future flood damage.  
The community was regularly barraged by storms and flooding.  In 1978, 
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1980, and 1982, storms caused at least $93 million in flood claims.172  
These claims could have been avoided if St. Bernard had fulfilled its 
obligations to mitigate flooding.173  FEMA174 argued that St. Bernard’s 
obligation was contractual and that it was liable for all damages 
stemming from its breach.  The Fifth Circuit disagreed, refusing to 
recognize a contract and subject municipalities to “unlimited liability.”  
It rested its decision on its finding that there was no statement in either 
the NFIA or FEMA’s regulations literally declaring that participation 
creates a contract.175  Nothing short of that would establish a contract. 
Courts are also reluctant to find municipalities liable in tort.  In St. 
Bernard, the Fifth Circuit set down a precedent that essentially bars 
FEMA from bringing a negligence claim against non-compliant 
communities.  St. Bernard could not hide behind sovereign immunity 
(abandoned in Louisiana), nor could it readily shield itself from tort 
liability under the public duty doctrine; but nevertheless, the court denied 
most tort claims.  To do this, it extended its contract holding.176  Because 
the court held that Congress did not intend to heap unlimited contractual 
liability upon municipalities, it must not have intended to assign massive 
tort liability either.177  According to the court, “[i]t is unreasonable to 
argue . . . that the NFIP, a program designed to lessen the massive public 
outlay for federal disaster assistance, could be foisted in its entire cost 
onto the very people Congress was trying to protect from the prohibitive 
cost of flooding.”178 
However, in some instances courts will allow FEMA to bring a tort 
claim.  In St. Bernard, the Fifth Circuit established the precedent that the 
agency can pursue subrogation claims.  The court recognized that 
insurance law, including the principle of subrogation, applied to the 
NFIP.  Although the court found that FEMA lacks standing to pursue its 
own negligence claims, its private insureds can subrogate their claims to 
the agency.  This could be a viable avenue for FEMA because it could 
stand in the shoes of a large number of claimants and seek substantial 
damages.   
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However, once in court, FEMA has historically been unable to show 
causation.  Courts have been reluctant to find that municipality 
negligence is the proximate cause of flooding damage.  Flooding arises 
amidst major weather events, and courts usually find that they are 
proximately caused by an “act of God.”179  Showing that damage is not 
caused by a severe natural disaster is a high evidentiary hurdle.  Proving 
this for enough properties to make a suit monetarily worthwhile is even 
tougher.  The combination of these two factors significantly deters 
FEMA from making subrogation claims.180 
The Fifth Circuit prevented FEMA from asserting other causes of 
action as well.  It ruled that the NFIA did not imply a private right of 
action.181  It also denied FEMA the right to sue a municipality over 
damage to its own public property.182  The court recognized the insurance 
law principle that an insurer cannot sue its insured.183  FEMA, therefore, 
cannot sue a municipality with respect to its own property.  Insurance 
law makes an exception when the insured acts fraudulently, but this 
exception is of little use to FEMA.  Intentional non-compliance may 
amount to fraud, but evidentiary problems combined with monetary 
concerns render such a claim impractical.184  The amount of damages 
would not be “litigation-worthy.”185  Only a fraction of all insured 
properties are public. 
2.  Potential and Existing Risks 
A non-complying port city sees a very favorable legal landscape, but 
risks do exist.  The court’s position could erode significantly in the areas 
of both contract and tort.  Courts could begin to see non-compliance as 
bad faith.  A court wishing to punish this behavior has a readily 
accessible option.  It need look no further than the shaky principles 
underpinning the Fifth Circuit’s contract holding in St. Bernard.  That 
court briskly passed by FEMA’s logical argument that a contract existed.  
The agency plainly asserted that a municipality’s agreement to comply 
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with federally imposed conditions in return for subsidized insurance is in 
the nature of a contract.186   
A more in-depth analysis than the court gave inevitably leads to the 
conclusion that FEMA was right.  In holding that no contract existed, the 
Fifth Circuit relied upon Pennhurst State Schools & Hospital v. 
Halderman,187 but misinterpreted its holding.  Pennhurst established that 
a contract exists when Congress imposes an obligation as a condition of 
federal funding.188  The key is that an obligation is imposed.  Mere 
precatory language, such as an expression of a simple desire or the 
encouragement of certain behavior, will not create a contract.189  In fact, 
Pennhurst recognized the “well-settled” distinction between 
“encouragement” and the “imposition of binding obligations.”190  It also 
confirmed that Congress understood this difference and its 
significance.191   
To better understand the distinction between a contractual obligation 
and mere precatory language, Pennhurst provided several working 
definitions, including the following three.  First, King v. Smith provided 
an example of a contract.192  In King, Alabama received federal funds 
under the Social Security Act, but breached its obligation to aid needy 
families with children.193  The U.S. Supreme Court found that 42 U.S.C. 
§§ 603, 602(a)(9) (1964) created a contractual obligation.194  Section 
603(a) established the main part of the obligation.  It read, in pertinent 
part, that “the Secretary of the Treasury shall pay to each State which has 
an approved plan for aid and services to needy families with children . . . 
.”195  This subsection established a state’s obligations to have an 
approved plan as a condition of receiving federal funding.  This is a 
simple and clear quid pro quo.   
Section 602(a)(9) provided the specific part of the plan that Alabama 
violated.  It read: “A State plan for aid and services to needy families 
with children must . . . provide . . . that aid to dependent children shall be 
furnished with reasonable promptness . . . .”196  This subsection 
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established that an approved plan includes the prompt furnishing of aid 
to dependent children.  The two subsections, read together, established 
that Alabama was contractually obligated to provide prompt aid.  
Alabama had not done this, and the Court found this to be a breach of 
contract.  Thus, the Court found a contract even though Congress did not 
literally state that a contract was created.   
The Pennhurst Court provided another example of a contract by 
pointing to language in the Developmentally Disabled Assistance and 
Bill of Rights Act of 1975.197  One of the Act’s funding sections, 42 
U.S.C. § 6063, stated: “[a]ny State desiring to take advantage of this 
subchapter [funding for University Affiliated Programs] must have a 
State plan submitted to and approved by the Secretary under this 
section.”198  As in King, this language imposed a contractual obligation 
upon participating states to have an approved plan in return for federal 
funding.  This is another clear quid pro quo.  Section 6063 went on to 
enumerate the specific requirements of the plan.  Failure to satisfy those 
requirements would result in a contractual breach.  Here, as in King, 
Congress did not specifically state that a contract is created. 
The Pennhurst Court also provided an example of language that did 
not create a contract.  The Developmentally Disabled Assistance and Bill 
of Rights Act of 1975 also set forth certain rights, including the 
following: “Persons with developmental disabilities have a right to 
appropriate treatment . . . .”199  It was argued that this language imposed 
an obligation upon states to provide “appropriate treatment.”  However, 
the Court held that this was a mere Congressional affirmation, akin to a 
purpose statement, that had no specific bearing on the relationship 
between the states and the federal government.  It did not impose a duty 
upon states to act.  It was not a condition of federal funding.200  There 
was no consideration or quid pro quo.  The establishment of this right is 
much more precatory in nature than contractual.  Congress would have to 
speak much more clearly than this to create a contractual obligation. 
When compared to these examples, the NFIA clearly reflects a 
Congressional intent to impose a contractual obligation upon 
participating municipalities. Notably, § 4022 of the NFIA reads: “no . . . 
flood insurance coverage shall be provided under this chapter [National 
Flood Insurance] in any area (or subdivision thereof) unless an 
appropriate public body shall have adopted adequate land use and control 
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measures (with effective enforcement provisions) which the Director 
finds are consistent with the comprehensive criteria for land management 
and use . . . .”201  Here, just as in King and in the Pennhurst funding 
section, there is an expectation that the municipality will fulfill an 
obligation before receiving federal funding.  Congress clearly 
conditioned the receipt of subsidized flood insurance on the adoption and 
enforcement of building restrictions.  This is an obvious quid pro quo.    
This is not the only section in the NFIA that shows a Congressional 
intent to impose a contractual obligation.  It can also be seen in § 4012:  
The Director shall make flood insurance available in only those 
States or areas (or subdivisions thereof) which he has determined 
have . . . given satisfactory assurance that . . . adequate land use 
and control measures will have been adopted [as specifically 
required] . . . and that the application and enforcement of such 
measures will commence as soon as technical information . . . is 
available.202  
Here again, there is an expectation that flood insurance will only be 
given to those municipalities that promise to comply with FEMA’s 
building restrictions.  A promise is a clear contractual obligation.  This is 
another obvious quid pro quo.   
The language of the NFIA also shows that Congress knew the 
difference between contractual and precatory language.  It used 
contractual language when laying out municipalities’ obligations in the 
sections just described.  It used simple precatory language when laying 
out general principles that were merely purpose statements.  In § 
4001(e), the first section of the act, Congress stated: “It is the further 
purpose of this chapter [National Flood Insurance] to (1) encourage State 
and local governments to make appropriate land use adjustments to 
constrict the development of land which is exposed to flood damage and 
minimize damage caused by flood losses . . . .”203  This was the only time 
Congress used the word “encourage” in a precatory context.   
It used the term “encourage” in a later section of the NFIA, but the 
purpose of that usage was not to express a Congressional wish.  In § 
4102(c), Congress stated that  
the [FEMA Administrator] shall from time to time develop 
comprehensive criteria designed to encourage, where necessary, 
the adoption of adequate State and local measures which, to the 
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maximum extent feasible, will– (1) constrict the development of 
land which is exposed to flood damage where appropriate, (2) 
guide the development of proposed construction away from 
locations which are threatened by flood hazards, (3) assist in 
reducing damage caused by floods, and (4) otherwise improve 
the long-range land management and use of flood-prone areas . . 
. .204  
Here, “encourage” is not the active verb.  It is not the focus of the 
sentence.  The focus of the sentence is the design of adequate criteria.  
The active verb is “designed.”  “Encourage” is used as an infinitive.  Its 
purpose is merely to describe adequate criteria. 
While courts could easily find municipalities contractually liable, 
some are already beginning to find them tortiously liable.  Not all courts 
are willing to allow the ever-present “act of God” defense to immunize 
municipalities from tort liability.  Courts have grown more willing to 
find that municipality negligence is the proximate cause of flooding.  
They are especially willing to assign liability when the municipality 
creates or perpetuates a known hazard.205  As a result, suits against 
municipalities have been increasing.206  For example, in Saden v. Kirby 
(1995), a municipal water and sewer board was held liable for flooding 
that followed heavy rains in 1983.207  The Supreme Court of Louisiana 
found that the proximate cause of some of the flooding was the board’s 
failure to repair certain known structural problems before the rains came.  
Some of the flooding was attributable to an “act of God,” but expert 
witnesses convinced the court that the height of the flood waters would 
have been several inches lower had the repairs been made beforehand.  
The board was held liable for that part of the damage that resulted from 
the higher flood levels.208 
VI.  CONCLUSION 
A port city could end up in front of a court that is willing to find 
contractual or tort liability.  There is ready-made case law that would 
strongly support a finding of contractual liability, and we are already 
beginning to see liability for negligence.  Nevertheless, the overall 
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present legal landscape is favorable for a non-complying community.  
Courts are still mostly entrenched in their unwillingness to assign 
massive liability to municipalities.  For twenty-five years, St. Bernard 
has stood as a testament to the fact that courts do not want to make cash-
strapped municipalities financially beholden to the federal government.   
Port cities have another powerful force on their side: the force 
majeure.  The concept of force majeure has an imposing presence in 
negligence cases.  The assumption that a force majeure is the proximate 
cause of flooding is a tall obstacle for FEMA to surmount.  The expense 
of making such an evidentiary showing would not warrant a suit.  
Monetary judgments would not be high enough.  Port cities’ natural 
defenses would keep flooding damage relatively low.  If FEMA imposes 
severe restrictions on development that are unwarranted because the 
flooding risk is low and economic opportunity high, port cities should 
not comply. 
While port cities pursue non-compliance, Congress and FEMA 
should work to incorporate economic factors into the determination of 
floodplain building restrictions.  A first step in the right direction would 
be the creation of a statutory and regulatory niche for working 
waterfronts.  This body of law would recognize the natural protection 
these harbors have from flooding.  There is a reason why thriving centers 
of commerce and economic activity have risen up in these areas, and 
they should be allowed to continue to thrive.  Certainly their economic 
health should not be threatened by off-base predictions.  The NFIP, 
created to reduce financial exposure, should not be a source of economic 
harm. 
